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A 3 day exercise simulating unrest and a large explosive eruption at Katla volcano, Iceland, was conducted in
January 2016. A large volume of simulated data based on a complex, but realistic eruption scenario was compiled
in advance and then transmitted to exercise participants in near-real time over the course of the exercise. The
scenario was designed to test the expertise and procedures of the local institutions in charge of warning and
responding to volcanic hazards, namely the volcano observatory, national civil protection, and the local university-
science sector, as well as their interactions with the European science community and the London Volcanic Ash
Advisory Centre. This exercise was the first of this magnitude and scope in Iceland and has revealed many
successful developments introduced since the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull and 2011 Grímsvötn eruptions. Following the
exercise, 90% of participants said that they felt better prepared for a future eruption. As with any exercise, it also
identified areas where further development is required and improvements can be made to procedures. Seven key
recommendations are made to further develop capability and enhance the collaboration between the volcano
observatory, volcano research institutions and civil protection authorities. These recommendations cover topics
including notification of responders, authoritative messaging, data sharing and media interaction, and are more
broadly applicable to volcanic institutions elsewhere. Lessons and suggestions for how to run a large-scale volcanic
exercise are given and could be adopted by those planning to rehearse their own response procedures.
Keywords: Exercise, Practice, Explosive eruptions, Iceland, Volcano observatory, Hazard response, Preparedness, Risk
management, International response to volcanic crisesIntroduction
Practising and testing emergency procedures are funda-
mental for ensuring effective responses in operational
environments during real crises. Conducting realistic ex-
ercises provides a means to validate contingency plans,
to develop individuals’ competencies and give them
practice in carrying out their roles and to test established
procedures in order to reduce and/or manage disaster
risks (Payne 1999; Perry 2004; Peterson and Perry 1999).
The practice of running exercises is common in many
disciplines where crises management procedures need to
be in place to react to possible emergencies, for example
in civil protection, hospitals, the emergency services, and
the nuclear power industry (Hart 1997; Lakey et al.
1983; Larsson et al. 2015; Kim 2013; Kim 2014; Payne
1999; Berlin and Carlström 2011, 2015). In these fields,© Crown. 2020, corrected publication 2020. O
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and Carlström 2015): 1) Drills exercises aimed at reinfor-
cing an individual’s knowledge and skills in a single organ-
isational field, for instance fire-fighting techniques for the
fire department; 2) General or strategic exercises relying on
a simulated event to evaluate the outcomes of different in-
terventions and therefore aimed at testing the management
of the emergency team rather than individuals’ skills; 3)
Collaboration exercises, which are a combination of the
first two types and involve organisations that are not all
represented at one site. The objective of collaboration exer-
cises is to develop and practice collaboration at all levels
between different organisations so that their coordinated
response to an emergency will be optimal. Such cross-
sector collaborations make the design of these exercises
more challenging (Berlin and Carlström 2011, 2015).
Collaboration exercises can have many benefits, in-
cluding testing how the overall response works, identify-
ing problems due to overlaps in responsibilities, testingpen Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
u give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
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different agencies to understand each other’s roles and
to build and strengthen relationships (Payne 1999). For
example, a study by Larsson et al. (2015) revealed that
decisions made in Sweden during the response to the
2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption strongly benefited from
pre-crisis joint agency training and exercises that had
been conducted, even though the exercised scenarios
were unrelated to volcanic crises.
Exercises can take a variety of forms from discussion-
based table-top exercises, to functional exercises,
through to real world full-scale exercises, depending on
their objectives. Irrespective of the type, debriefing post-
exercise is as essential as the exercise itself (Kim 2013,
Payne 1999) to guarantee that the outcomes are the sub-
ject of future implementations or review. An exercise
which identifies areas for improvement is just as suc-
cessful, in fact perhaps more so, as one where everything
runs exactly as planned. It is important that one of the
main drivers of an exercise is to detect loop-holes, er-
rors, oversights and other problems (Hart 1997).
Managing an emergency situation due to a volcanic event
requires cooperative effort between different organisations.
These institutions may include, but are not limited to, a
volcano observatory, a national/state geological or geophys-
ical institution, local police, national civil protection author-
ities, politicians and volcano research institutions. Such
multi-agency involvement increases the complexity of the
response, as plans need to be coordinated between different
areas of expertise. A study of the response to the 1995
eruption of Ruapehu, New Zealand (Paton et al. 1998),
recommended the development of comprehensive inter-
organisational networks, accompanied by exercises. They
highlighted that exercises and simulations were a key com-
ponent of preparedness training, providing opportunities
for practising skills and using knowledge in realistic scenar-
ios and conditions.
Within the volcanological community, the practice of re-
hearsing procedures to respond to potential volcanic crises
has become more common in recent years. However there
are only a limited number of published examples of large-
scale exercises performed for volcanic areas (Barberi and
Zuccaro, 2004; Lindsay et al. 2010; Marzocchi and Woo
2007; Ricci et al. 2013). These are mostly for volcanoes that
have a low eruption probability but a very high risk, due to
high population density. Most of these exercises have in-
volved both scientists, as providers of data and interpreters
of the event and the hazard assessment, and decision
makers, as users of such information to quantify the risk
and to design appropriate mitigation actions.
Between November 2007 and March 2008 the Minis-
try of Civil Defence and Emergency Management of
New Zealand tested its national preparedness for a vol-
canic eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field whichunderlies New Zealand’s largest city (Doyle et al. 2015;
Lindsay et al. 2010; O’Rouke and Coetzee 2008). The ex-
ercise scenario involved more than 1500 people and 125
institutions (Deligne et al. 2017). Because of its unusual
four-month duration, this large-scale exercise was able
to include a realistic timeline for precursory activity until
the onset of the eruption. In this way contingency plans,
but also connections between local, regional, national
and international agencies could be tested, as well as the
implementation of new approaches for eruption fore-
casting, to support the near-real time volcano monitor-
ing and decision-making (Lindsay et al. 2010).
In Italy, the area surrounding Mount Vesuvius and
Campi Flegrei is at high risk due to potential eruptions
from these two volcanic systems. In 2006 and 2014, two
major exercises took place to improve preparedness for
eruptions at both volcanoes. The “Mesimex” exercise in
2006 (Barberi and Zuccaro 2004; Marzocchi and Woo
2007; Ricci et al. 2013) involved contributions from civil
protection in assessing evacuation plans in the surround-
ing towns. The “Vuelco” exercise in 2014 (Papale and De
Natale 2015) reviewed the scientific response capabilities
and the effectiveness of communication with civil pro-
tection authorities.
The work presented here focuses on Iceland and the
current procedures in place to manage volcanic crises. Des-
pite the low population density living close to the majority
of Icelandic volcanoes, the population exposed to volcanic
hazards increases significantly when tourists are considered.
In addition, the potential for volcanic ash to affect local and
international air transport (as clearly demonstrated during
the Eyjafjallajökull 2010 eruption) is a significant factor
(Budd et al. 2011; Mazzocchi et al. 2010). The Icelandic
Meteorological Office (IMO) is responsible by law for mon-
itoring all natural hazards in Iceland and issuing warnings
and forecasting when possible. IMO is also designated by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the
volcano observatory with responsibility for volcano surveil-
lance in Iceland to mitigate risks to aviation in case of
explosive eruptions. Consequently, IMO and the London
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC), hosted by the UK
Met Office, conduct regular small-scale exercises called
VOLCICE (Reichardt et al. 2017). This is a series of
monthly exercises between IMO, ISAVIA (the air service
provider in Iceland) and the London VAAC to test the spe-
cified ICAO aviation response procedures (ICAO 2014). In
each VOLCICE exercise a scenario involving a volcanic
eruption in Iceland or Jan Mayen, Norway is responded to
over the course of a working day. Occasionally these exer-
cises are run on a national level in Iceland to also address
the ground-based impacts of potential eruptions. In these
cases, participants are expanded to include civil protection
and other relevant stakeholders, such as the Icelandic elec-
trical companies, who will have to react and implement
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ally a larger scale pan-European “VOLCEX” exercise is
held, aimed at testing communications channels and
contingency plans for responding to ash in the atmos-
phere that might threaten aviation (ICAO 2016). These
involve meteorological watch offices across Europe, together
with EUROCONTROL and the London and Toulouse
VAACs. Approximately every 2 years the VOLCEX focuses
on an Icelandic volcano.
Despite the frequency of these exercises, the full chain
of interaction that would occur during a real volcanic
eruption in Iceland is rarely tested. In particular, these
exercises do not fully integrate the necessary scientific
interactions that would occur, as well as the broader
context in which an event would be placed (international
and local civil protection, media interest, etc). Although
general guidelines for scientists have been developed on
how to respond to volcanic crises (Giordano et al. 2016;
Newhall et al. 1999), opportunities to practice and de-
velop these skills for a volcanic event are limited.
To address these broader aspects, two collaboration
exercises were held in 2014 and 2016 to simulate vol-
canic eruptions in Iceland. They were conducted within
the FUTUREVOLC project, a European consortium of
26 partners, including many relevant organisations in
the volcanological community. This paper focuses
mainly on the second exercise that ran for 3 days and
involved the entire FUTUREVOLC community, as well
as external contributors, responding to a realistic
eruption scenario at Katla volcano. The objectives of this
exercise were not only to test the operational procedures
(a standard exercise goal), but also to test the use of
international scientific expertise during a crisis, which
was a unique and ambitious target. The many data
streams created and used by this large community pose
challenges for technical operations and scientific inter-
pretation by the Icelandic institutions, hence the exer-
cises had a significant focus on data use and sharing.
Exercises which cover the whole response chain from
monitoring at the volcano observatory, through interpret-
ation, to alerting civil protection, and ultimately issuing
warnings to the general public and practising responses
such as evacuations are highly complex to design and run.
The least exercised parts of the response chain are the in-
terpretation of data and the formulation and issuing of
warnings, and exercises aimed at practicing these are
probably the most difficult to design and execute. The ex-
ample described here suggests how to design and run such
an exercise.
We believe that the practice of running exercises within
the volcanological community (on both small and large
scales) is extremely beneficial and should be encouraged
and supported. Similarly, the sharing and reporting of ex-
ercise experiences is necessary to build awareness of theirimportance and establish best practices. The aims of this
paper are to document what has been learnt from con-
ducting these large-scale exercises, to present what we
have found to be good practice for running such an exer-
cise, and to demonstrate the value of doing them well.
An overview of the planning and execution of the exer-
cises is given in the next section, while more details on the
exercise preparation and scenario can be found in the
Additional file 1. Outcomes and issues identified during
the Katla exercise are summarised in the results. In the
discussion we focus on the main results that had an im-
pact on the emergency procedures in place in Iceland as
well as those that involve collaborators in Europe. We also
highlight the key lessons learnt about running a large
volcano exercise. The approach and the methodologies
presented here can be adopted by other institutions inter-
ested in running similar tests and, in this way, we hope
this paper contributes to designing common guidelines
for effective volcanic exercise execution.
FUTUREVOLC project overview
The FUTUREVOLC project grew from the need for a
more holistic approach to volcanic hazard monitoring,
assessment and eruption response for volcanoes in
Iceland following the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull in
2010 and Grímsvötn in 2011. The project was funded by
the FP7 Environment Programme of the European Com-
mission and ran from October 2012 to March 2016, with
26 project partners from academia, civil protection and
industry groups. The project was led by the University of
Iceland together with IMO and it combined European
expertise across the full spectrum of volcanic processes,
monitoring, modelling and civil protection response.
The main objectives of FUTUREVOLC were to (i) es-
tablish an integrated volcanological monitoring system
for Icelandic volcanoes through European collaboration;
(ii) develop new methods to evaluate volcanic crises; (iii)
increase scientific understanding of magmatic processes,
and (iv) improve delivery of relevant information to civil
protection and other authorities.
The focus here is on the fourth objective. In Iceland,
the national response framework for volcanic events is
currently based upon interaction and coordination be-
tween IMO (the volcano observatory), the National
Commissioner of the Icelandic Police (NCIP, the na-
tional authority for Civil Protection), the Institute of
Earth Sciences of the University of Iceland (UI, the aca-
demic sector), and ISAVIA (the national air navigation
service provider of Iceland, for flight safety issues). Good
communication and interaction between all these orga-
nisations are essential and well-established procedures
are in place (Fig. 1). These procedures are constantly
reviewed whenever new events or scenarios may suggest
the need for improvement (Thorkelsson et al. 2012).
Fig. 1 Diagram showing the crisis communication channels between the volcano observatory (circle), the national civil protection (pentagon) the
university-science sector (square), and other scientific community members (triangle). To the left are the arrangements prior to the FUTUREVOLC
project and to the right are the exercised arrangements. The arrows indicate the flow of communication between the organisations (black) and
in relation to the scientific advisory board (orange)
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was the 16 academic institutions involved in the project.
Multi-disciplinary interpretations of observations and
data are becoming increasingly important to decipher
the nature of the processes that could lead to an
eruption. However, international academia has no de-
fined role within the Icelandic response framework and
for this reason the processes for involving these organi-
sations are ad-hoc and less well coordinated. Ensuring
that volcano observatories can make the best use of all
available data, including monitoring equipment and data
acquired by academic partners is vital. One aim of
FUTUREVOLC was to establish this link more firmly for
Iceland and foster interaction and knowledge exchange
between different scientific disciplines during unrest and
eruption. To this end, an explicit component of the pro-
ject was to conduct two exercises to test and demon-
strate existing and new response procedures, data flow
and communication channels across all partners.
The exercise methodology
Two types of collaboration exercises were conducted
within FUTUREVOLC: (1) a communication exercise in
2014 and (2) an end-to-end exercise in 2016. The spe-
cific objectives for both exercises are described below. In
both cases all project participants (either science/data
providers or users) were included and they were re-
quired to act and respond as if the volcanic event was
real. The second exercise also included key stakeholders
such as the London VAAC, the media and international
civil protection interests. The planning and execution of
these exercises drew heavily on the institutional experi-
ence of IMO, NCIP and the UK Met Office gained from
the VOLCICE and other thematic exercises.Communication exercise in 2014
The first exercise was conducted in June 2014. This was de-
signed to test the notification and communication processes
between FUTUREVOLC partners. The objectives of this
first exercise were to (1) test a new notification system for
responders and scientists (Fig. 2); (2) test communication
tools and procedures; (3) test the response of FUTURE-
VOLC members and assess the chains of communication,
with a specific focus on whether the key contact persons at
each institution received the information they required in a
timely manner.
The scope of this first exercise was deliberately limited,
as without effective communications it was acknowl-
edged that anything more complicated was likely to fail.
Checking and proving communications across the whole
range of stakeholders and contributors was an essential
first step for the success of a more ambitious exercise.
The exercise was led and coordinated by IMO and was
run over 1 day, timed to coincide with a planned VOLCICE
exercise. This brought more realism to the situation and
allowed the end-to-end processes at IMO to be tested. The
exercise scenario involved a large (20 km column height)
but short-lived (4.5 h) eruption at Hekla volcano in south
Iceland.
A post-exercise questionnaire was sent out to all par-
ticipants to enable the exercise to be evaluated. The
questions included if and how partners had received the
notifications, what additional information they would
have liked (if any), how they responded, who they com-
municated with and how, how they reacted in real-time
to notifications from IMO when activity was changing
and any lessons that had been learnt. Based on the find-
ings, five key areas for improvement were identified -no-
tification, response, communication, data sharing and
Fig. 2 The FUTUREVOLC (FV) notification process and management implemented during the first exercise. The institutions responsible for making
decisions are indicated in the second column. Three main communication channels are considered here: email, posts to the FUTUREVOLC blog,
and SMS text messages. The Volcinfo weblist is an email dissemination list owned by IMO and used to send out information on volcanic activity
in Iceland. It includes all FUTUREVOLC members in addition to a wide international recipient list. In an event, experts from IMO, UI and NCIP
discuss the activity and depending on how unusual the event is, e.g. if it is of pure scientific interest and/or requires monitoring, they will decide
whether to update different stakeholders including the FUTUREVOLC consortium. The dotted polygons indicate actions that are at the discretion
of the responsible organisation(s)
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address these.
A key issue identified was the need to improve communi-
cation across the whole scientific consortium for discussing
data (either direct observations or processed results) amongst
the different disciplines. The most common tools for com-
munication were email and telephone, formats which do not
lend themselves well to multi-disciplinary discussion, but
which are readily available to most parties during a volcaniccrisis. Whilst there were excellent examples of data sharing
within subject-area groups and between individual partners,
the exercise revealed a clear need to improve data inte-
gration across the different observations and disci-
plines. The use of a newly developed blog site aimed at
promoting cross-disciplinary discussions was trialled,
but this revealed problems that needed to be addressed
before it could be considered to provide support for
discussions during a crisis (Witham et al. 2015).
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step in the design and planning of the second exercise.
The main change implemented after the first exercise
was the earlier activation of the UI group by IMO as
part of its response procedure.
End-to-end exercise in 2016
The “end-to-end” exercise took place on the 25–27 January
2016, with some initial event information released during
the preceding day. The aim of this second exercise was to
provide an end-to-end test of the Iceland volcanological
supersite established through FUTUREVOLC (Dumont
et al. 2018). The exercise was designed to test the human
networks, data sharing tools, decision-making procedures,
and communication channels to end-users.
Icelandic volcanoes exhibit a wide range of eruptive
styles, which pose different hazards and may require dif-
ferent responses, meaning it is not feasible to design a
single exercise to test all eruptions. Following the gas-
rich eruption at Bárðarbunga in 2014–2015 (Gislason
et al. 2015; Gudmundsson et al. 2016; Pfeffer et al. 2018;
Sigmundsson et al. 2015), which required a real response
from the project and operational partners (Barsotti et al.
2019), it was decided that this exercise needed to test
the project’s response to a large ash-rich eruption for
which specific tools were developed during the project
(e.g. Dürig et al. 2018; Woodhouse et al. 2016).
Specific objectives identified for the 2016 exercise were
to test: (1) the notification system and internal communi-
cation (including the response level/preparedness of each
partner); (2) data sharing through the new FUTUREVOLC
data portal and associated scientific exchanges between
the volcano observatory and academia; (3) the field activity
coordination within Iceland for the scientific community;
(4) the dissemination of timely information to end-users
including civil protection and the VAAC. A minimum ex-
ercise duration of 3 days was deemed to be necessary to
ensure that the whole response procedure could be tested
- from precursory activity through to the onset and end of
an eruption – and allow the involvement of most partici-
pants whatever their specialty.
Katla volcano was chosen as the subject of the exercise
due to its potential to generate several hazards both
prior to and during an eruption (Eliasson 2014; Gud-
mundsson et al. 2008). Katla is located in south Iceland
under the Myrdalsjökull glacier with a 400–600 m thick
ice cap covering the central volcano (Fig. 3). Past erup-
tions at Katla have comprised both large-scale explosive
activity in the central volcano as well as explosive and
effusive activity along its north-east trending fissure
swarm. This fissure swarm is where one of Katla’s big-
gest eruptions, the Eldgjá eruption, took place in 934 AD
(Larsen 2000; Óladóttir et al. 2008; Thordarson and
Larsen 2007). Katla is one of the highest risk volcanoesin Iceland due to the relatively high number of people
(locals and tourists) potentially exposed to volcanic haz-
ards in the area and the fact that access to the region is
limited to the Iceland ring road (Gudmundsson et al.
2008).
A team of Icelandic and international scientists was
tasked with defining a realistic scenario and providing a
consistent multi-disciplinary dataset that would be
streamed in (near) real-time during the exercise. The
timeline of the main geophysical events specified by this
team to characterize the volcanic unrest at Katla is sum-
marised in Fig. 4. Full details on how the exercise was
designed and how the volcanological scenario evolved
through the 3 days are provided in the additional file 1.
The timing of the exercise was chosen to occur during
a VOLCICE exercise. This provided an existing oper-
ational framework into which the exercise could be inte-
grated. All the FUTUREVOLC partners involved in the
exercise were required to act and respond as if the
volcanic event was real. Most collaborators participated
during office hours only (08:00–17:00 UTC), except the
operational partners, IMO and London VAAC, who
continued to play overnight whilst the eruption was
ongoing.
Figure 5 provides a detailed overview of the exercise
timeline, associated phenomena in the scenario, events
and consequent actions. This figure summarises the
actions taken by the different players and how these
were linked and triggered by the “status” of the volcano
(simplified by the aviation color code) or by the latest
observation or information available on the event’s
progress.
During the 3 days the aviation sector was kept informed
through the standard notification and alerting procedures,
which included phone calls from IMO regarding changes
in the aviation color code. This information meant that the
London VAAC was able to produce timely Volcanic Ash
Advisories (VAA) for the appropriate parts of exercise.
Two scientific advisory board (SAB) meetings (including
representatives from IMO, NCIP and UI) were held at
IMO on the first 2 days to discuss the observational data
and assess the on-going event.
To ensure that there was no confusion with a real
eruption, caution was taken during the whole exercise
and all documents and data released were tagged with a
message stating that they were related to a FUTURE-
VOLC exercise. Examples of the types of data produced
during the exercise by the players as a result of analysis
and processing are given in Fig. 6.
In order to evaluate the success and the efficacy of the
exercise a structured debriefing was performed. This in-
volved a cross-organisational debriefing, an evaluation of
the exercise by the exercise coordination team, a debrief-
ing at each local institution and the dissemination of a
Fig. 3 a Location of Katla in south Iceland (red box) and the volcanic zones distributed along the divergent plate boundaries (dark grey zone).
The glaciers are coloured in cyan and the closed lines depict the volcanic centres. b The Mýrdalsjökull glacier (cyan) and the subglacial Katla
volcano. The glacier contours are spaced every 100 m. The borders of the caldera are indicated by a purple hatched line. The watersheds beneath
the icecap are indicated by the grey dashed lines and the rivers are in dark blue. The purple star shows the exercised centre of the seismic
activity at Gvendarfell. The red circle within the caldera indicates the Mogi source of deformation associated with the exercise’s main eruption
and the red star corresponds to the eruption site. The geothermal cauldrons of relevance to the exercise are shown by orange circles. The ring
road is plotted in light brown and the green triangle indicates a road bridge that was swept away on day 1 of the exercise
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their perception of its success and gain feedback. Internal
reviews were performed rapidly after the exercise at each
operational institution, as well as a joint one in Iceland,
allowing discussion and decisions on the follow-up actions.
Results
The scope and scale of a three-day exercise provided an
unprecedented test of response procedures allowing the
identification of gaps and areas of possible improvement
for a contingency plan for Iceland that includes foreign
institutions. This exercise was the first of its type in
Iceland and was positively engaged in by FUTUREVOLC
project partners and local institutions such that theresponse in terms of meeting organisation, data flow,
etc., was very realistic.
Nineteen of the twenty-six FUTUREVOLC partners
responded to the evaluation questionnaire and some or-
ganisations provided responses from different specialist
groups. Of the responders, 90% said that they felt better
prepared for the next Icelandic eruption as a result of
the exercise and 74% responded that their institution
will do something differently as a consequence of the ex-
ercise, demonstrating a constructive outcome in terms
of modifying behaviours and procedures. All participants
were positive that the exercise had been a useful under-
taking. Here we analyse the outcomes of the exercise in
light of the four goals identified prior the exercise.
Fig. 4 Overview of the event evolution during the exercise. Most FUTUREVOLC partners participated during normal business hours only (08:00–
17:00 UTC). The dashed area corresponds to the working hours during which the FUTUREVOLC community was asked to respond to the exercise.
The coloured arrows provide information on the nature of the hazardous events: dark blue is used for magmatic processes, light blue is for
hazardous phenomena involving water, red is for hazardous phenomena impacting the atmosphere, e.g. explosions, and green indicates surface
processes such as rock-fall
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In its first year, the FUTUREVOLC project introduced a
new notification system for volcanic unrest in Iceland
(Fig. 2) that formally included academic project members
in the early alerting process. This was successfully tested
in the 2014 exercise. In the 2016 exercise, however, the
FUTUREVOLC activation process was superseded by
partners using their own communication channels. Tech-
nical complications also prevented the SMS notification
system from triggering the first warnings to all individuals.
From this experience, it appears clear that the notifica-
tion and activation process used for the wider academic
community needs to be simplified and fully established
within the official procedures. Any agency working with
the volcano observatory should design an internal activa-
tion system so that a notification does not depend on a
specific individual.
During the exercise there was a considerable volume
of communication between partners, both using online
tools and via email and telephone. This was very positive
and demonstrated that the project had successfully
forged new relationships between organisations andindividuals leading to cross-disciplinary interactions that
had not occurred before. Over 90% of questionnaire re-
sponders said that they felt properly informed about the
status of activity at the volcano during the whole of the
exercise.
Data sharing
During the exercise, discussions on instrumentation and
data took place successfully between individuals and their
existing contacts in Iceland or abroad through various com-
munication channels such as personal emails, videoconfer-
ence meetings, phone calls and blog posts. Three main
web-based systems were used during the exercise: the pro-
ject management software, a blog and the FUTUREVOLC
data portal. FUTUREVOLC’s web-based project manage-
ment software Basecamp (https://basecamp.com/) was de-
signed to facilitate daily routine management of the project,
work package discussions, general announcements, and also
allow document and report sharing. It allows the user to
send communications to the entire project community or
to subgroups related to specific work packages, with emails
sent each time a new message is posted. Used regularly on
Fig. 5 Outline of the key actions by the main stakeholders (IMO, UI, NCIP, media and others (locals, aviation sector)) during the execution of the
exercise. The Aviation Color Code (ACC) is indicated and the different coloured symbols are similar to those used in Figs. 1 and 2. The volcano
symbol in the second column on day 2 indicates the timing of the onset of the explosive eruption
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were familiar enough to launch discussions and make sure
the information/data were spread to the whole or any sub-
groups of the project consortium. The heavy usage of such
a web tool was however unexpected and created an un-
necessary load of emails. Conversely, the official blog web-
site which was created during the project to promote data
sharing and scientific discussions within the consortium
was underutilised, mostly due to difficulties with tracking
new and specific posts. The FUTUREVOLC data hub(http://icelandicvolcanoes.is/), a data sharing platform that
was one of the main objectives of the project, was tested for
the first time during the exercise. This hub was intended to
be the place where all the IMO monitoring data would have
been hosted in order to be shared with the wider commu-
nity. Project members were also authorized to upload data.
Different kinds of data (from raw to processed data) could
be downloaded by any users registered beforehand. This
data hub was least used reflecting that this channel did not
fulfil the needs and expectations of users for sharing their
Fig. 6 Sample exercise data products processed and produced in ‘real-time’ by exercise participants. a The top panel shows surface displacement
from day 1 to day 3 from GPS (black arrows) and InSAR (acquired on day 2). The middle panel shows the modelled displacement (Bagnardi and
Hooper 2018) and the bottom panel shows the residual for the InSAR data, as well as a comparison of GPS data-model using black and red arrows
respectively. The data reveals a deflation signal caused by a shallow source that is located at ~ 2500 +/− 200m depth, centred beneath Katla,
according to the best model solution. b Cumulative tephra deposit as computed by the VOL-CALPUFF model (Barsotti et al. 2008). The contours show
the tephra loading in kg/m2 at the end of the eruption. c Students at the University of Iceland testing new ASH-SIZER instruments (Marchetti et al.
2014) in Reykjavik during the exercise. The instruments were streamed in real-time to both UI and IMO. d Estimate of the mass eruption rate (MER)
made using the PlumeRise model (Woodhouse et al. 2016). e Range of MER estimates from the REFIR integrated system (Dürig et al. 2018)
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there were some technical problems.
With these three data sharing systems, in addition to
IMO’s official email dissemination list, the information
flow rapidly became confusing and overwhelming with
information distributed in a poorly organised manner.
The data sharing in almost real-time by a variety of part-
ners is a very positive result, but this experience rein-
forced the importance of metadata covering time/date/
validity to facilitate urgent searches.
Field activity coordination within Iceland
Deploying instruments in the field during a volcanic
crisis exposes people to volcanic hazards (Brown et al.2017), particularly during explosive eruption phases,
meaning personnel safety is a key consideration (e.g.
Carlsen et al. 2019; Deligne et al. 2018). For the majority
of partners with deployable monitoring equipment there
were clear pre-established channels of contact with the
local Icelandic monitoring staff and good communica-
tions during the exercise. Safety forms formalised by the
Icelandic institutions during the Bárðarbunga eruption,
which allow them to keep track of scientists in the field
and to keep individuals updated regarding the evolution
of the eruption, were updated with specific information
related to the exercise eruption. However, there was a
lack of field safety advice available for workers outside of
the Icelandic organisations. The relative ease and speed
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it a particularly attractive destination for researchers dur-
ing eruptions, adding to the number of people who may
wish to go into the field. Existing procedures for managing
these individuals mean that as soon as the volcanic area is
closed, each foreign scientist/institution that wants to take
part in data collection or volcano monitoring should fol-
low a process involving filing an application with NCIP
and passing through check-points on route to the field.
This process should be followed by everyone, regardless of
whether they are already in close collaboration with an
Icelandic institution, but this was not clear during the
exercise.
For some disciplines, the deployment of instruments
requires a preliminary set of analysed or modelled data
to inform where the equipment should be located. For
example, to collect falling tephra during an eruption
meteorological data for the following hours and days,
together with forecasts of the ash plume dispersion and
deposition, will allow better planning of the sampling
strategy in the area surrounding the eruption site. This
requires additional data flow and specific communica-
tion channels to be identified in advance to make sure
they will be implemented optimally during a crisis. The
testing of new equipment in this exercise, including a
tephra-sampler, has helped identify where such require-
ments exist and further response plans are needed.
Dissemination of information to end-users
Any volcanic unrest in Iceland is likely to trigger inter-
national interest. To ensure that authoritative information
is being shared, IMO openly provides as much informa-
tion and data as possible via its website and existing dis-
semination routes. The three-day exercise was the first
real test of the newly implemented Volcano Observatory
Notice for Aviation (VONA) reporting system at IMO.
The VONA report follows a standard template provided
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO
2014; Lechner et al. 2009) and is designed to be issued
whenever there is an update of the aviation color code for
the target volcano. During the exercise the VONA was
distributed by email and contained information about the
eruption status and changes in activity. However, because
this system was not introduced to the project members
and official stakeholders prior to the exercise, its introduc-
tion led to some initial confusion. This illustrates the need
for continuous dialogue with all stakeholders when new
modes of communication are introduced.
As soon as the unrest phase was identified, scientific
advisory board (SAB) meetings were organised at IMO
to discuss the volcano status and volcanic hazards.
These involve the three main Icelandic agencies and
worked well for internal communication between these
bodies and reinforced practices established duringprevious eruptions. However no systematic reports were is-
sued by the SAB during the exercise despite this being the
standard procedure put in place during the Bárdarbunga
eruption (2014–2015) (Barsotti et al 2019). The SAB report
is designed to be different to the VONA as it aims to trans-
mit a joint multi-disciplinary interpretation of the observa-
tion datasets and provide possible eruption scenarios as
agreed by the three national institutions. This report is then
shared externally. The lack of this report created confusion
between partners who expected it to be released. This dem-
onstrates how important it is that all established procedures
are carefully checked and followed during any type of train-
ing or exercise.
The FUTUREVOLC exercise gave the London VAAC
an opportunity to test its procedures in the most realis-
tic situation possible outside of a real event, with the
changing nature of the scenario providing a realistic
context. Communication between IMO and the London
VAAC was very good with regular telephone contact
and the VAAC was first to know of any changes in activ-
ity or colour code.
One of the significant challenges for replicating reality
was the use of non-standard email lists by IMO for dis-
seminating information during the exercise. This was
done in an effort to not cause confusion in the outside
world, but meant that some users did not receive infor-
mation. In addition, the lack of information on the IMO
website (which also had been a deliberate choice in the
preparation of the exercise) was identified as hindering
the stakeholders in their work, which is something that
would need to be addressed in any future exercise of this
scale.
During the exercise participants were asked not to
post to social media to prevent any external misunder-
standing about the exercise status. In a real event, how-
ever, social media will quickly become full of posts
related to the activity, which could be both real and
false. This could impact significantly on communications
and exchanges of information. During the Bárdarbunga
eruption, regular posts by IMO, UI and NCIP on their
own websites and social media pages significantly con-
tributed to a reduction in the distribution of incorrect
information, as these institutions are recognised as a pri-
mary source of authoritative information. This activity
can be time consuming so ensuring in advance that
there are clear guidelines for social media use and re-
sponsible individuals in charge of keeping accounts up
to date is highly recommended.
Even with proactive dissemination of information, the
news media will always want to speak to individuals dir-
ectly. Feedback from participants who were contacted
during the exercise made it clear that they struggled to
find time to respond, even though the volume of en-
quiries during the exercise was considerably smaller than
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only likely to be worse in a real event.
Discussion
Simulating the occurrence of a natural hazard through
an exercise can be a powerful and effective tool for
improving the response to such events (Bignami et al.
2012; Brown et al. 2016; Pallister et al. 2019). The key
drivers for the FUTUREVOLC exercises were the testing
of the readiness of response plans and the identification
of areas where further development was needed, which
are similar to other volcanic exercises that have been re-
ported in the literature.
The first objective of the 2016 exercise was to test the
notification system set up during the project. Although
several communication tools were developed during the
project lifetime, this exercise has shown that to be effect-
ive the notification system in Iceland should be primarily
activated using direct phone calls from IMO to the main
stakeholders (including civil protection and experienced
researchers at the University of Iceland). The activation
of collaborators and other scientists to support the inter-
pretation of the on-going event can then be triggered
with notifications via emails and SMS. A protocol based
on SMS messages was tested during the project lifetime
and revealed to be a useful tool for communicating
changing volcano activity to a large number of people
such as the FUTUREVOLC consortium. Although the
system did not work properly during the lifetime of the
project, the idea of an SMS-system for the quick trigger-
ing of other institutions to respond to an eruption has
been formally implemented at IMO in 2018 and its use
is currently part of their contingency plans.
More generally, the use of different communication
tools during the project has been an important step to
evaluate communication channels and more specifically
to see whether or not any of them are appropriate for a
large consortium like FUTUREVOLC to use during an
eruption. It is clear from our experience that platforms
for communicating and sharing data should be decided
on and practised prior to an emergency to avoid any
confusion in partner exchanges. This allows partners to
be familiar with the communication platform, making
the response more efficient and rapid. Creating efficient
communication channels is essential for allowing exter-
nal institutions to be included in supporting daily moni-
toring procedures without overloading them. Debriefing
discussions led to the conclusion that data sharing
through a single open-access platform is not workable
during a crisis. A large amount of all kinds of data, in-
cluding preliminary analyses as well as volcano hazard
assessments, was shared in near-real time on the same
platform. This caused confusion as the most relevant
products and pieces of information became buried. Itwas also concluded that data exchange and scientific dis-
cussions should not take place in the same platform.
Based on the exercise evaluation and partners’ feed-
back, a number of areas stood out as needing further
work and development. To address them, seven recom-
mendations were formulated by the project team leaders.
All of these relate to the more general response capabil-
ity of the Icelandic Institutions and as such they have
been already considered for improvement to and imple-
mentation in the operational response plans at IMO, UI
and NCIP. The recommendations are also directly rele-
vant to other institutions worldwide that are responsible
for responding to volcanic emergencies.
They are:
1. Implement platforms for real-time data sharing and
discussion between organisations. It is
recommended that the local institutions (civil
protection, volcano observatory, university and/or
related institutions) make the decision together
about the tools that they wish to use to
communicate during a volcanic crisis with their
closest partners. Such communication tools need to
be practised to become familiar to individuals and
therefore contribute to efficient exchanges during a
crisis. Mailing lists used between the local
institutions and the external partners should be
kept up to date.
2. Ensure that the volcano observatory is the main
source of scientific information to prevent
dissemination of the wrong messages through social
networks and the media. This is in line with
IAVCEI protocols and recommendations from the
Volcano Observatory Best Practice meetings
(Pallister et al. 2019). The production and
dissemination of a regular (daily) update from the
volcano observatory or a multi-agency “scientific
advisory board” should be a standard procedure
during exercises, unrest and activity to ensure an
official source of information.
3. Streamline notification activation procedures across
all institutions responsible for responding to a
volcanic crisis, for example by adopting a basic SMS
system for a quick alert, and identify who is
responsible for the activation of external
collaborators. In Iceland, the scientific advisory
board should include in its procedures the criteria
for when and how to call out for international
scientific support. This group should also have
oversight of the membership of notification lists
(e.g. SMS or email). By gathering people from the
volcano observatory, national civil protection and
university, the scientific advisory board should also
be able to review and update the notification
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different organisations.
4. Appoint a cross-organisation fieldwork coordinator
to ensure consistent safety procedures. Fieldwork
coordination should be a priority. A fieldwork
coordinator or a coordination team should be
established at the start of any unrest/eruption to
whom requests for fieldwork are directed. This
person (or team) has responsibility for providing
field safety information to all groups and for
coordinating access/deployment to the field for
non-operational teams. This may need to be a joint
role between the volcano observatory, national civil
protection and university/academic-sector to ensure
that the latest situation is always taken into
consideration. The contact details for this
coordinator must be clearly available.
5. Appoint an experienced point of contact for all
media interactions at each institution. A dedicated
press officer to coordinate response to the media is
beneficial for all parties, with some process of
deferring enquiries away from individuals. This
person should be in contact with the scientific
advisory/management team previously described
and should be updated daily. They should be
proactive in organising and providing press
briefings thus reducing direct email traffic to
individuals. To achieve this goal, the contact details
for the press officer must be clearly available to the
outside world.
6. Commit to practising the response plans by testing
the entire chain. The recommendation in Iceland is
to implement a multi-day exercise on a 1–2 year
basis to keep practising and improving the response
and cooperation/collaboration at a national and
international level between institutions.
7. Pre-plan the human resource distribution required
during an eruption as part of preparedness
activities. Each institution needs to develop a plan
for how to fulfil all their required actions with the
human resources that are available to them, given
that there are often not enough people to cover the
load in times of crises.
Legacy of the exercises on operational emergency response
The two exercises, in particular the second one, have con-
tributed to reinforcing the collaboration between the local
institutions in Iceland (civil protection/observatory/uni-
versity) and to establishing new procedures in both the
notification system as well as data sharing protocols. For
example, since the second exercise, the University of
Iceland is always activated during the monthly VOLCICE
exercises organised by IMO and the London VAAC. Simi-
larly, the contact list at IMO including people from UI hasbeen reviewed and updated within the IMO contingency
plans (in terms of both priority and people contacted).
The exercises have triggered further changes in Iceland
including the implementation of a password-protected blog
to share updates, data and opinions about ongoing events.
The blog is currently a basic channel for quick communica-
tion between relevant parties and it was widely used during
the unrest period at Öræfajökull volcano that was declared
in November 2018 (Barsotti et al. 2018). A web-interface to
send SMS to a variety of phone numbers has also been de-
veloped and implemented. The SMS is sent to people at
IMO, UI and NCIP. Sending a SMS containing key infor-
mation in a time of crisis is now part of the response
process for the person on duty at IMO. Regular tests are
done to verify the functionality of the system and to update
the SMS-contact list. Recently IMO has invested in hiring a
public relations person dedicated to dealing with the in-
bound and outbound flux of information and requests dur-
ing a crisis due to natural hazards in Iceland. Part of their
role is to liaise with the Iceland Government’s National Cri-
sis Coordination Centre press team, which was established
during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption to provide a single
voice of information (Bird et al. 2017).
The exercise also revealed improvements that could be
made to the operational London VAAC procedures and
products. For example, more formal procedures for inter-
action between the London VAAC forecasters and science
support staff during an eruption have been implemented,
with pre-scheduled meeting times now arranged that fit
within the VAAC’s 6-h response cycle. In addition, the ex-
ercise exposed issues with the length of commentary text
that can be contained in official VAAC advisories, with
some becoming truncated during the exercise. Procedures
have been updated to ensure that text contents are re-
stricted to the maximum limits.
Lessons learnt in running an exercise
We have gained considerable experience in preparing
and running exercises, of which some reflects lessons
learnt from exercises in other disciplines, but some is
more unique to the volcanological community.
Lesson 1: It is important not to try to accomplish too
much in each exercise. It is better to identify a few clear
objectives to make sure these aspects are properly tested
during the exercise, rather than trying to test many as-
pects. An emergency response plan can be seen as modu-
lar and exercises can be designed to practice only part of
it. This was the approach used in the first FUTUREVOLC
exercise. It provided a useful building block to not only
test a few key procedures, but also gain experience in run-
ning a multi-participant exercise. This approach also
allowed us to introduce the concept of exercises to those,
particularly in the academic community, who were not
used to this process. These participants in particular may
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help them understand their role and what is expected of
them.
Lesson 2: Do not under-estimate the time required to build
a realistic and consistent scenario for multi-disciplinary
datasets, especially when experts from different institutions
around the world are involved. Ensuring consistency between
the various datasets plays a key role in how the exercise
players will respond. Planning for the Katla exercise took ~ 2
months and approximately 1 day was needed to prepare each
dataset.
Lesson 3: In addition to preparing data, decisions will
be needed in advance regarding the content of any an-
nouncements or notifications that are released during
the exercise. The relay of these messages during the ex-
ercise should be made by the relevant people at the local
institutions involved in the exercise, but these contacts
should also monitor the progress of the response and
intervene, if necessary, to guide or compensate for any
misunderstanding or misinformation.
Lesson 4: The start and end times of the exercise are
an important consideration. It is important to consider
possible different time zones and guarantee a sufficient
duration for satisfactory participation. In the Katla exer-
cise, the longer 3-day duration meant that many people,
particularly in Iceland, were able to give it their full
focus and properly engage during working hours. This
long exercise was much more realistic than any other
short exercises run in the past, allowing a larger range of
multi-agency emergency response to be tested.
Lesson 5: In running an exercise there is a careful bal-
ance to be struck between restricting the dissemination
of information to only the participants, so as not to
cause confusion with the outside world (i.e. non-playing
stakeholders and the public), versus testing the full dis-
tribution routes and email lists. In the Katla exercise real
email distribution lists were not used, which was a disad-
vantage and led to some artificiality in communication
routes. On review by the exercise coordination team, it
was identified that this had reduced the exercise realism.
Any exercise should be well advertised beforehand via
all normal channels of communication, with information
on when it will take place, what modes of communica-
tions will be used and what the purpose of the exercise
is. To prevent any confusion all messages sent out
should be labelled “EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXER-
CISE”, both at the beginning and the end of the
message.
Lesson 6: Achieving success from such an exercise re-
quires short and long-term considerations. In the short-
term, conducting a review of the exercise is essential.
This should be done across the whole participant group,
but also within individual institutions as an opportunity
to review their own response and procedures during avolcanic crisis. Translating the feedback and exercise
outcomes into actions is perhaps the most important
step so that lessons are truly learnt. In the longer term,
it is important to document and share what has been
implemented post-exercise, i.e. demonstrating what has
become real. This gives value to the exercise and pro-
motes positive engagement at both the individual and
institutional level for future exercises.
Conclusion
The rationale for carrying out exercises such as those pre-
sented here is to test both established and new procedures,
but also to identify areas where things do not work as ex-
pected and can be improved. The FUTUREVOLC project
provided the opportunity to practice the response to an
eruption in Iceland in much greater depth than the regular
monthly exercises and to investigate the important role
international scientific collaboration can have in managing
a volcanic crisis. The review of the outcomes led to the
identification of seven key recommendations for improving
response procedures that can be generalised to other
volcano observatories and operational contexts within the
volcanological community. Based on our experience, we
also provide suggestions and guidance for observatories
and similar agencies seeking to develop and run exercises.
The paper reveals the importance of participating in
inclusive projects that allow a wide view on the topic of
responding to an eruption and shows how national and
international collaborators can support local institutions
that might not have a complete monitoring system. By
practising the response to an eruption through multi-
agency exercises, the project has helped form long-term
collaborative frameworks for better practices and pre-
paredness between organisations. The improvements
identified by the FUTUREVOLC exercises have lasted
longer than the project lifetime and have become part of
the operational response plan at the national scale. This
confirms the legacy of such a challenging project and
also demonstrates the importance of running exercises,
on both small and large scales, within the volcanological
community and the benefits of sharing experiences
about these.
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